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Knowledge Is Power: What Went
Wrong in the Mutual Fund Industry
INTRODUCTION
A COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST THE HEDGE FUND CANARY CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC,
by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer just after Labor Day in 2003 acceler-
ated the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) focus on investment com-
pany governance and the role of independent directors.' Spitzer alleged that the
hedge fund had managed to persuade a mutual fund complex's management to let
it make quick profits by rapid trading of fund shares at the expense of other inves-
tors.' The popular press picked up on the Spitzer charges, which, as other examples
of market timing were uncovered, became known as the "mutual fund scandal."3
Partner Emerita, Of Counsel, Dechert LLP; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of
Law.
1. Complaint, State of New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, No. 03-402830, 2003 WL 22341460,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 3, 2003). Spitzer uncovered a practice involving mutual funds that invested in securi-
ties traded in foreign markets. Large, savvy investors, including hedge funds, learned that many of these mutual
funds did not take into account events that occurred after the foreign markets closed and that were likely to
cause the securities trading in those foreign markets to rise or fall in value when they reopened the next day.
For example, a mutual fund invested in securities traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange would price the value of
the fund's shares at 4:00 p.m. New York time, based on the closing price of the securities on the Tokyo Ex-
change, which had closed 14 hours earlier. Computer modeling, however, taking into account succeeding
events known to affect prices in those 14 hours, might well indicate that the Tokyo market for the securities in
the fund portfolio would rise when it next opened. In common parlance, the price a mutual fund would set to
buy a share of the foreign fund would be "stale." If it was too low, the investor bought mutual fund shares at a
bargain price and turned around and sold the shares at the more contemporary price. In effect, these investors
skimmed profits from the fund's long-term shareholders.
Word of this technique spread quietly among a class of investors who put it to good use. Although a few
academics wrote about the strategy, the mutual fund industry ill appreciated its efficacy. Moreover, while it was
described as market timing, it bore little resemblance to the popular understanding of market timing. Popu-
larly, market timing was thought to mean a misguided belief that one could "time" when the Dow Jones would
rally, or when technology stocks would decline. In a new era of global trading across markets on a nearly 24-
hour basis, "market timing" to Canary Capital and others meant successfully predicting that movements in the
European and U.S. markets would directly affect the prices on the Tokyo market the next day. Some of these
investors who wanted to enhance their ability to predict the likelihood that a foreign market would open up or
down from its close, also cajoled mutual fund personnel into letting them place trades after the 4:00 p.m. New
York City cutoff time to take into account later-breaking developments affecting the direction of the markets.
2. See generally id.
3. See, e.g., In re Banc of Am. Capital Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 26756 (Feb. 9,
2005); In re Fremont Inv. Advisors, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 26650 (Nov. 4, 2004); In re
Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 26629 (Oct. 8, 2004); In re Mass. Fin. Serv. Co.,
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Congress threatened to adopt remedial legislation. Ultimately, the SEC responded
by proposing and adopting a rule requiring most mutual funds to ensure that at
least seventy-five percent of the directors be independent of mutual fund advisers
and that the chairman of the board be independent.' The SEC Commissioners in
favor of the rule said the scandal could have been averted had the rule been in
place.'
The wrongdoings that made headlines were related to practices surrounding the
sale and distribution of mutual fund shares, and for good reason. The investment
advisory firms that sponsor and manage mutual funds earn money by charging
investment-advice fees calculated as a percentage of the assets under their manage-
ment, e.g., seventy-five basis points per annum on the multimillion-dollar size of
each mutual fund in the complex they advise. In turn, investment advisory firms
are valued on the basis of the magnitude of assets under their management. As a
result, a crucial goal of investment advisory firms is to increase assets under man-
agement if at all possible or, at minimum, to maintain those assets.
This fundamental business goal is unlikely to change. But installing independent
fund directors and chairmen in order to protect shareholders from the unre-
strained ambition of mutual fund advisers will fail without some critical thought
about the role of independent directors. The fix is no panacea. In order to function
effectively, independent directors, or at least some of them, must become knowl-
edgeable about the business of mutual funds.
Consider the following hypothetical: The president of a complex of mutual funds
is also a senior officer of the adviser to the funds, where his chief responsibility is to
direct sales activities and increase assets across the mutual fund complex. His bonus
is based on increasing assets. He receives an email from a member of the sales force
stating that a large investor is willing to commit $80 million for the long term in
the complex's bond fund if the investor is allowed to buy in and out of the com-
plex's Asian equity fund on a nearly overnight basis. The quid pro quo here is that
the total assets under management in the fund complex will increase in exchange
Investment Company Act Release No. 26347 (Feb. 5, 2004); In re Strong Capital Management, Inc., Investment
Company Act Release No. 26448 (May 20, 2004); In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26532 (Aug. 18, 2004); In re Gary L. Pilgrim, Investment Company Act Release No. 26655 (Nov. 17,
2004); In re Harold 1. Baxter, Investment Company Act Release No. 26656 (Nov. 17, 2004); In re Pilgrim Baxter
& Assoc., LTD, Investment Company Act Release No. 26470 (June 21, 2004); In re Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26412 (Apr. 8, 2004).
4. See Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,378-79, 46,381 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
5. Id. at 46,378-80. The rule was adopted by a split Commission vote, and two of the five SEC Commis-
sioners registered strong dissents. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce subsequently challenged its adoption. Com-
plaint, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. SEC, Case No. 1:04CV01522, 2004 WL
2245645 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 2, 2004). On April 7, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit decided that although the Commission had the authority to adopt the rule, it had not complied with
§ 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. The court said it would vacate the
rule's challenged requirements unless the Commission took remedial action to comply with the APA, giving the
Commission 90 days to report back to the court.
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for permitting the investor to trade the international fund rapidly. One of three
things may occur:
Scenario 1:
The president perceives no legal issues, and while not entirely happy that it might
hurt the performance of the Asian equity fund, he emails the salesman, without
consulting anyone else, saying, "I'm not entirely happy with this, but it is, after all,
$80 million in long-term assets."
Scenario 2:
The president thinks the proposal should be discussed with counsel to the adviser.
Counsel sees two questions: First, does the prospectus of the Asian fund impose
restrictions on rapidly trading in and out of the fund? Second, would this activity
harm the shareholders of the fund because it would hurt the fund's performance?
Counsel determines that the prospectus would permit letting the investor market-
time because it is silent as to whether this conduct is acceptable. And the portfolio
manager, in this case, states that the proposed market timing will not hurt the
fund's performance. The president emails his agreement to the proposal to the
salesman.6
Scenario 3:
Before signaling acceptance based on the steps taken in Scenario 2, the president
tells the board of directors of the international equity fund that the adviser pro-
poses to let a few investors market-time the fund, explaining that both counsel to
the adviser and the portfolio manager have signed off on the matter.
Would the independent directors have perceived a problem? Not unless at least
one of them understood what this new form of market timing entailed, why it
worked, what the dynamics of the daily pricing of fund shares were, and what the
fundamental genesis of forward pricing Rule 22c- 1 was-a rule designed to prevent
an investor from placing a buy order at an older, lower, and obviously stale price.7
6. On the basis of facts set forth in SEC orders, however, in some cases portfolio managers complained
about the effect of market timing. See, e.g., In re Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Company Act Release
No. 26312A (Jan. 15, 2004). These facts were not disclosed to fund directors.
7. Taking advantage of stale pricing of mutual fund shares is not a new phenomenon. On Sunday, March
31, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson made the surprise announcement that bombing in North Vietnam would
be substantially reduced and that he would not run for reelection. Charles J. Elia, Peace Hopes, Not Exit of
Johnson, Are Behind Big Rally, Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1968, at 33. Much of the trading market
expected the stock market to open on Monday morning substantially higher than the Friday close. Traders who
counted on this belief flooded the market, buying mutual fund shares at prices reflecting the stale Friday
closing prices, thereby allocating to themselves a big piece of the rise in market value of fund shares. See id. As a
result, it is the author's understanding that a senior fund official called the SEC Chairman, advocating that the
SEC require fund shares to be priced prospectively, i.e., at a price determined after an order is received and
Rule 22c-1 promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 was adopted. The investors investigated by
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The directors would have needed to understand that newfangled "market timing"
was far different from relying on a hunch that the Asian sector should outperform
other geographical markets. They would have needed to know that computer mod-
els had been developed by sophisticated investors to help them reliably predict the
likelihood that the securities in an Asian stock fund's portfolio would, based on
their correlation with the direction of the U.S. market, rise when next priced,
meaning that the price of the fund's shares would also rise. The directors would
also have needed to understand that by permitting a particular investor to buy at a
lower, stale price and sell a day or two later at the anticipated higher price, the fund
was permitting favored investors to allocate to themselves a disproportionate
amount of the gain in the price of the fund's shares. In effect, all long-term inves-
tors were being asked to hand over some of their gain to the short-term market
timer. The directors might also have understood the stakes better had they known
how the senior officers of the adviser were compensated and that they would re-
ceive bonuses based upon increasing assets under management.
Without question, the adviser should have made a more thorough presentation
to the board dealing with the issues of the disproportionate allocation of gains in
the portfolio to the market timers and, if so, the portfolio manager's concern as to
the negative effect on fund performance. The point here, however, is that familiar-
ity with the mechanics of mutual fund share pricing and the policies underlying
Rule 22c-1, as well as with the new market-timing strategy afoot, would have been
essential to understanding the issues underlying the President's presentation. Direc-
tors knowledgeable about the industry and its practices might well have been able
to have challenged a superficial presentation, thereby preventing market timing.
The Focus on the Role of Independent Directors in the Investment Company Act
and by the SEC
Since its inception, the Investment Company Act of 1940 has looked to the moder-
ating power of independent mutual fund directors.' In 2001, the SEC chose to
trump the statutory language that required forty percent of an investment company
board to be independent, by requiring, as a practical matter, that a majority of the
directors be independent.9 The SEC increased that percentage to seventy-five per-
Mr. Spitzer and the SEC offset the purpose of Rule 22c-l by computer modeling whether a fund share price
could be expected to rise or fall when it was next determined.
8. Section 10(a) of the 1940 Act sets the 40% requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000). Congress ini-
tially considered requiring that a majority of the directors be independent, but became concerned that if it did,
the independent fund directors would have the power to dismiss an adviser that the investors had "chosen" by
virtue of having decided to invest in the fund. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on H.R.
10065 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 109-10 (1940) (state-
ment of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, Investment Trust Study, SEC).
9. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, 66 Fed. Reg. 3,734, 3,736 (Jan. 16, 2001) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 270, 274). This requirement was imposed as a condition precedent to the
use of ten Exemptive Rules that modify flat proscriptions against certain transactions between an investment
company and its affiliates found in the 1940 Act (the "Exemptive Rules"). Id. The most prevalent form of
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cent in the controversial rule it adopted in 2004, which was coupled with a require-
ment that a mutual fund board chairman be an independent director.'" In the
Proposed Release in which the Commission recommended these changes, it said
that recent events, including late-trading and market-timing activities, suggested
the need to revisit fund governance because the market timing and late trading
indicated "a serious breakdown in management controls in more than just a few
mutual fund complexes.""
The majority of the Commissioners concluded that the fund complexes that had
engaged in market timing and late trading were characterized by situations in
which "the fund adviser exerts a dominant influence over the board. Because of its
monopoly over information about the fund and its frequent ability to control the
board's agenda, the adviser is in a position to attempt to impede directors from
exercising their oversight role." 2 While the Proposed Release indicated that in some
cases the board may have lacked information or may have been deceived, the ma-
jority of the Commissioners endorsed the view that requiring a supermajority of
independent directors and an independent board chairman would, in itself, effec-
tively change board dynamics, empowering the independent directors. 3
In the Adopting Release, the Commission majority said that "by increasing the
independence of fund boards, the amendments are designed to improve the quality
of the oversight of the process for the benefit of fund investors. Vigilant and in-
formed oversight by a strong, effective and independent fund board may help to
prevent problems such as late trading and market timing."' 4 It added that requiring
fund boards to be chaired by an independent director would be beneficial because
"the chairman of a fund board can have a substantial influence on the fund board
agenda and on the fund boardroom's culture."'5 The two dissenting SEC Commis-
investment companies subject to the 1940 Act is the open-end management company, commonly called a
mutual fund. Investment companies, including mutual funds, that can forgo using every one of the ten Exemp-
tive Rules need comply only with the 1940 Act requirement that 40% of the board be independent. However,
any mutual fund that relies on using Rule 12b-l, a key Exemptive Rule, to help it finance sales and marketing
activities-and that includes most mutual funds-must comply with the present or future conditions the SEC
has or may establish in order to use any of the Exemptive Rules. It has been estimated that some 90% of funds
use one or more of the Exemptive Rules. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,390 n.7.
10. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,382.
11. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 3,472, 3,472 (Jan. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 270).
12. Id. at 3,473.
13. Id. at 3,478.
14. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,386 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 270).
15. Id. at 46,386. The majority's emphasis on the efficacy of requiring independent directors to be in the
majority was based on a tenet that gained substantial support in the corporate governance literature beginning
in the 1980s where it was identified with reform in the governance of operating companies. In that arena,
Enron and the other major corporate mishaps led more recently, with strong encouragement from the SEC, to
adoption in 2003 by the New York Stock Exchange (and the American Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq) of
listing standards requiring that a majority of the board be independent. Notices, Self-Regulatory Orgs., Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64154, (Nov. 4, 2003) at 16-17.
VOL. 1 NO. 1 2006
KNOWLEDGE IS POWER
sioners challenged the legitimacy of the rule on a number of bases, including the
cost of implementation and a lack of evidence that the requirements would have
averted market timing and late trading. 6 They pointed out, in the Adopting Re-
lease, that a common feature among funds that had been used to late-trade and
market-time was that their boards were simply not told of those arrangements.17
The Commissioners said that a better focus would be to hold investment advisers
accountable as having a fiduciary duty of their own to act in the best interest of
fund shareholders."8 This duty was violated, the Commissioners said, when the ad-
visory personnel bartered the right to late trade and market time mutual funds
under their management in exchange for increasing the advisers' profitability by
increasing the aggregate assets they managed. 9 Moreover, a number of the mutual
funds that permitted late trading and market timing were governed by boards with
a high proportion of independent directors. In fact, when the market timing scan-
dal occurred, a substantial number of mutual fund boards had more than a simple
majority of independent directors, and some had designated an independent direc-
tor as "lead director" or, on occasion, had named an independent director as
chair.2" This argument was consistent with a "best practices" report published by
the Investment Company Institute in 1999 recommending that at least two-thirds
of the directors of mutual funds be independent and that independent directors
designate one or more lead directors.2'
It is significant that the SEC did not explain why it believed increasing the per-
centage of independent directors to seventy-five percent would substantially im-
prove shareholder protection, other than to advance a "more is better" view. The
majority merely said in the Adopting Release that the seventy-five percent require-
ment "will help ensure that independent directors carry out their fiduciary respon-
sibilities."22 Nor did the majority spell out a proactive role to be played by an
independent chairman, stating that "[t]he board chairman can play an important
role in setting the agenda of the board, and in establishing a boardroom culture
16. Id. at 46,390-93.
17. Id. at 46,391.
18. Id. at 46,392.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 46,391 n.22 (citing a letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Mar. 10, 2004), responding to the request for comments made in the
Proposing Release and stating that the "current practice" was to have a two-thirds majority of independent
directors).
21. JOHN J. BRENNAN ET AL., INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, ENHANCING A CULTURE OF INDEPEN-
DENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR FUND DIRECTORS, 10,
25 (1999). The report stipulated that its best-practices recommendations might not be suitable for every fund,
but said that in cases where at least two-thirds of the directors were independent, this percentage could help
ensure that the independent directors could control the voting process at the board level. Id. at 10. While the
report did not contemplate the idea of having an independent director chair board meetings, it recommended
designating one or more lead directors who could, among other things, serve as a "point of contact" for raising
and discussing issues with counsel and the investment adviser. Id. at 25.
22. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,382.
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that can foster the type of meaningful dialogue between fund management and
independent directors that is critical for healthy fund governance." 3
ASKING TOO MUCH OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
While the SEC's emphasis on the crucial role that independent directors play in
protecting mutual fund shareholders is important, its focus on their role has, over
time and in a perverse way, attenuated the influence and authority of independent
directors. The SEC has asked independent directors to undertake oversight duties
that, in some cases, cannot realistically be done and, in other cases, have become
nothing more than a board-level review of routinized checklists. As a result, inde-
pendent directors, as well as investment advisers, may have come to believe that
independent directors cannot provide meaningful input.
A recent compliance rule the SEC adopted in the aftermath of the mutual fund
scandal exemplifies other SEC rules that look on independent directors as wielding
talismanic, ceremonial powers.24 That rule required all investment companies, in-
cluding mutual funds, to adopt and implement by October 5, 2004, policies and
procedures "reasonably designed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities Laws
by the [mutual] fund, . . . [its] investment adviser, [its] principal underwriter,
administrator and transfer agent. . ."" Using a standard paperback compilation of
Federal Securities Laws published by Foundation Press as a rough benchmark, the
relevant statutes and related federal rules run to about two thousand pages.26
Funds, advisers, and other service providers spent months identifying all relevant
statutory requirements and related regulations and then prepared policies and re-
lated procedures designed to comply with the vast scope of the compliance rule.
These procedures and policies were themselves hundreds of pages long. They re-
quired the expertise of counsel familiar with every aspect of investment company
law, broker-dealer regulation, anti-money-laundering regulation, insider trading,
and all forms of federal securities law antifraud provisions, as well as the sustained
input of fund personnel familiar with the complex, day-to-day operations of funds
and their service providers. Counsel who were asked to look over the final product
23. Id. at 46,383. The language of the rule stipulating that use of any of the ten Exemptive Rules is condi-
tioned on having an independent chairman is consistent with this fairly amorphous role. It simply provides
that "[a] disinterested director serves as chairman of the board of directors of the fund, presides over meetings
of the board of directors and has substantially the same responsibilities as would a chairman of a board of
directors." 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(7)(iv) (2005).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-I (2005); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2005) (relating to rule 38a-1 but
covering compliance only with the Investment Advisers Act).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-l(a)(1) (2005). The rule defines Federal Securities Laws to include the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Investment Company Act
of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Title V of the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, any rules adopted by the
SEC under any of these statutes, the Bank Secrecy Act, as it applies to funds, and any rules adopted thereunder
by the Commission or the Department of the Treasury. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-l(e)(1) (2005).
26. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS (John C. Coffee, Jr. & Joel Selig-
man eds.. 2005).
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themselves needed days of intensive review to assess the viability of the policies, and
even then they could not be confident that the policies would prevent every viola-
tion of law, whether or not it was likely to be material.
Nevertheless, the SEC charged independent fund directors with just this respon-
sibility. A key component of the SEC's compliance rule was its reliance on the
oversight of independent directors. The compliance rule specifically required that a
fund's board of directors, including a majority of its independent directors, make a
finding that the policies and procedures presented to them were "reasonably de-
signed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities Laws by the fund, and by each
investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and transfer agent of the
fund."27 Many would contend that no board is capable of making such a finding,
and in making this demand, the SEC in a very real sense signaled to independent
directors that they were being asked to undertake an impossible task. In that sense,
it made board action more ritualistic than substantive."
The unwanted consequence of the SEC's own oversight of the oversight of inde-
pendent directors had been raised some twelve years earlier. In contemplation of
the fiftieth anniversary of the 1940 Act, the SEC's Division of Investment Manage-
ment ("Division") took a "fresh look" at the regulation of investment companies
and of investment company corporate governance.2 9 It concluded that SEC regula-
tion had embroiled fund board independent directors in a welter of detail.3 ° In its
report issued in 1992,"1 the Division also found that under the terms of the SEC
27. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-l(a)(2) (2005).
28. A board of directors might have been expected to assess whether the personnel of the fund and the
fund's service providers had engaged in a reasonable process to identify all relevant statutes and regulations
applicable to those entities within the scope of the Federal Securities Laws, as defined, and had the competence
to draft policies and procedures believed by the drafters to prevent and detect material violations. This is
consistent with the oversight function of directors. See, for example, Maryland General Corporation Law § 2-
405.1 governing the oversight duties of directors, which provides that "[i] n performing his duties, a director is
entitled to rely on any information, opinion, report, or statement, including any financial statement or other
financial data, prepared or presented by: (i) An officer or employee of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; (ii) A lawyer, certified public ac-
countant, or other person, as to a matter which the director reasonably believes to be within the person's
professional or expert competence; or (iii) A committee of the board on which the director does not serve, as
to a matter within its designated authority, if the director reasonably believes the committee to merit confi-
dence. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1(b)(1) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2005).
29. Letter from Marianne K. Smythe, Director, SEC Division of Investment Management, to Richard C.
Breeden, Chairman, SEC (May 1, 1992), Preface to SEC DIvisIoN OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, PROTECTING
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION (1992) [hereinafter PROTECTING
INVESTORS].
30. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 29, at 266, 270.
31. Id. at 266-67. The Division took the then prescient position that the 1940 be amended to require that
more than 50% of the fund's directors be independent and that they be self-nominating. Subsequently, rather
than seeking to amend the statute, the SEC effectively mandated that more than 50% of fund directors be
independent and that they be self-nominated through imposing these requirements as a condition of using the
Exemptive Rules. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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regulation, independent directors were required to make detailed quarterly and an-
nual findings that, according to the report, created "a major source of frustration. "32
Citing to Rule 17f-5 as an example, the Division said that according to commen-
tators, "the rule is unduly burdensome and difficult to administer, and embroils the
directors in matters involving an inappropriate level of detail."3 3 It said that in or-
der to "focus the responsibilities of board members into areas where they perform
best-namely exercising business judgment in conflict of interest situations-the
Division recommends eliminating provisions in certain rules under the [1940] Act
that make independent directors responsible for detailed findings of fact or for
reviews and findings that involve more ritual than substance." 4 It specifically rec-
ommended modifying or eliminating the board's functions in connection with six
of its rules, three of which are, ironically, among the Exemptive Rules the Commis-
sion said were so important as to require policing by a board consisting of at least
seventy-five percent independent directors and led by an independent chairman.
35
Because the Division of Investment Management's 1992 recommendation was
not adopted, and was, in fact, forgotten, mutual fund board materials continue to
be dominated by pages of backup data supporting compliance with the routine and
noncontroversial use of a battery of 1940 Act rules. These include rules that the
Division of Investment Management characterized as involving more ritual than
substance, but which are now enshrined among the ten Exemptive Rules said to be
the basis for an independent chair and an increased number of independent
directors.36
In fact, the pages of detailed backup data set forth in board materials almost
always demonstrate meticulous compliance with the procedures mandated by SEC
rulemaking, as well as meticulous compliance with other aspects of the 1940 Act.
While the precise data changes from quarter to quarter, its purport does not, lead-
ing independent directors to conclude that the funds they oversee are in compli-
ance with a bewilderingly picayune and sweeping 1940 Act regulatory structure,
that this is all that matters, and that this is what the SEC wants them to oversee.
These conclusions are buttressed by the typical inclusion in each board book of
detailed regulatory updates provided by counsel, fund auditors, or administrators
outlining the details of every newly proposed regulation, SEC enforcement action,
32. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 29, at 270 n.78.
33. Id. Rule 17f-5 then required a fund's directors to "approve foreign custody arrangements after consid-
ering numerous legal matters, country risk factors, and factors relating to the particular foreign custodian." Id.
34. Id. at 289.
35. Id. The six rules were Rules 10f-3, 12d3-1, 17a-7, 17e-1, 17f-4 and 22c-1. In sharp contrast to its 1992
view, the SEC said in the Adopting Release that 75% of the directors should be independent in order to use the
Exemptive Rules; that Rule 10f-3, for example, involved complex transactions; and that a fund's board should
be "vigilant not only in reviewing the fund's compliance with the procedures required by Rule 10f-3, but also in
conducting any additional reviews that it determines are needed to protect the interests of investors." Invest-
ment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,385 n.67 (Aug. 2, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
270).
36. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 29, at 289.
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and court decision relevant to the industry. Moreover, the agenda of fund meetings
is given over to review of the alphabet soup of regulatory compliance, reinforcing
the idea that the role of the independent directors is to review data that almost
never calls for questioning or discussion. The subliminal message is that the practi-
cal experience and wisdom of the independent directors are of little value? 7
Consciously or not, independent directors may feel marginalized. And advisers
may also have come to believe that the purpose of board meetings is to demon-
strate their compliance with specified regulations rather than to engage the board
in a discussion of goals and strategies.
FOCUS SHOULD BE ON INFORMED, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Independence is not, of course, the only qualification an independent director
should have. "Knowledge is power," 8 and so long as the adviser has significantly
more knowledge about the operation of the funds it advises, the balance of power
will remain with fund management. At least some independent directors must be
knowledgeable about the fund industry in general and the fund complex in partic-
ular. Skepticism is effective only when voiced by someone in a position to raise
questions with confidence. And directors must know what questions to raise.
In the corporate world, although airlines are different from pharmaceutical com-
panies or media companies, there is an underlying generic business model that
transcends regulation by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Drug
Administration, or the Federal Trade Commission. A board member with a profes-
sional background at a company that sells cosmetics shares much of a common
vocabulary with a counterpart at a corporation that sells cars. The utility of internal
budgets is part of a shared experience. For example, they can track, line by line,
projected revenues, expenses, net earnings, etc., against results year-to-date and
over other relevant periods, permitting a focus on what is going well or awry, and
the discipline of l0Ks, 10Qs, and 8Ks. Business leaders from other industries can
contribute their relevant experience and judgment in matters of corporate finance,
internal controls, information technology, human resources, public relations, etc.
As a result, management is more likely to perceive them as capable of providing
exactly this sort of input. In the best of circumstances, management believes that
independent directors sitting on corporate boards are valuable resources, particu-
larly in highly specialized industries such as biotechnology, which place a premium
on a scientific background.
37. It is worth noting that the content of board materials and the agendas of the boards of operating
companies are not laid out by the SEC, but directors can suggest or demand meaningful agenda items. Al-
though Congress reacted to the Enron and WorldCom corporate debacles by adopting a number of structural
changes designed to increase the effectiveness of independent directors sitting on corporate boards, it did not
seek to dictate the agenda of a corporate board meeting or the materials the boards were to review.
38. SIR FRANCIs BACON, The Essaies of Sir Francis Bacon; Knight, The Kings Attorney Generall: His Relig-
ious Mediations, Places of Persuasion and Dissuasion & Meditationes Sacrae (John Jaggard ed., 1623).
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In the case of fund boards, few if any boards have one or more independent
directors who have experience relevant to the fund industry. As a result, even if
seventy-five percent or more of their directors are independent or if the chairman
is independent, few fund boards are in a position to exploit fully the nebulous
power the SEC expects them to wield.
HELPING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS BRING MORE
THAN INDEPENDENCE TO THE TABLE
Boards that are able to attract at least one independent director with a background
in the industry should be in a superior position to provide fund managers with
useful support and an effective challenge precisely because they know where the
bodies are likely to be buried. While in many cases experienced members of the
industry cannot be sensibly considered as board candidates because their employer
is in direct competition with a fund complex, in some situations, the conflict will
be remote. Candidates for directorships may also include persons who have left the
mutual fund industry.
Independent directors might also seek to engage persons with industry experi-
ence as consultants. A consultant in tune with what is going on within the industry
can coach and mentor independent directors and help them spot practices and
trends that deserve their thoughtful attention. Organizations formed to help inde-
pendent directors perform their role might also develop searching educational pro-
grams that candidly focus on industry practices so that independent directors will
be in a position to hold their own at board meetings.
Independent directors can also take action to change the content of board mater-
ials and meeting agendas. The SEC is unlikely to act to reduce the number of mat-
ters that it believes the board must routinely review. The reams of materials
responsive to these matters, however, could be sent sufficiently in advance of board
meetings so that these items do not dominate the time available for deliberation at
board meetings unless, of course, these materials happen to raise an issue that
deserves serious discussion.
Independent directors can establish dedicated blocks of board time to discuss
industry practices with fund management. These might include a review of all of
the written and unwritten sale practices employed by the fund's agents, the use of
soft dollars within a particular fund group, procedures undertaken by the fund's
trading desk to obtain the best execution of orders put to brokers to effect
purchases and sales of securities in a fund's portfolio, resolution of conflicts of
interest that may arise when an adviser's clients include hedge funds with contrary
investment strategies, and the rationale for an adviser's range of fees paid by differ-
ent clients, as well as consideration of other topics as they invariably come to the
fore. An ongoing, multi-meeting review devoted to a rolling examination of key
compliance procedures adopted to prevent violations of law by the fund and its
agents might also help the board exercise effective oversight.
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We cannot know whether market timing could have been averted if fund boards
had understood just how and why market timing worked to the advantage of the
timers. But independent directors are likely to play a robust, interactive role in the
oversight of the fund's affairs when they have sufficient knowledge to be confident
in their ability to make a contribution and investment advisers are confident of the
value of their advice and consent. In short, the presence of independent directors
on the board is requisite to promoting meaningful board oversight, but that over-
sight must also be informed. The collective knowledge of the independent directors
is more important than their number.
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